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Who Beneﬁ  ts from 
Shared Capitalism?
The Social Stratiﬁ  cation of 
Wealth and Power in Companies 
with Employee Ownership
Edward J. Carberry
10.1    Introduction
The spread of various forms of shared capitalism in the last three decades 
raises a number of interesting questions relating to the persistence of broader 
patterns of inequality in the United States. Since shared capitalism programs 
broaden corporate ownership and how ﬁ  nancial returns of this ownership 
are distributed, as more employees gain access to these programs, what hap-
pens to existing patterns of stratiﬁ  cation? Do shared capitalism programs 
mitigate or exacerbate existing patterns of income and wealth inequality? 
How do women and nonwhites, groups that traditionally experience these 
inequalities most powerfully, fare with respect to shared capitalism? Finally, 
do companies with these programs open up access to other forms of partici-
pation within organizations, such as access to positions of power, authority, 
and inﬂ  uence?
Such questions are important for corporate managers in companies with 
shared capitalism and companies considering these plans. If certain groups 
of employees experience inequities in terms of participating in these plans 
and the ﬁ  nancial value they receive from these plans, these realities may 
detract from the potential that these plans oﬀer for aligning employee behav-
iors with long-  term corporate strategy and for creating organizational cul-
tures of fairness. These questions are also relevant for organizational and 
management theory, and for our understanding of social inequality in the 
twenty- ﬁ  rst century economy. Few studies have made connections between 
the vast literature on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of shared 
capitalism and the large body of sociological research that has examined the 
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impact of gender, race, and ethnicity on such outcomes as income, wealth, 
and power in the workplace. This chapter takes a modest ﬁ  rst step toward 
better understanding the connections between shared capitalism and social 
stratiﬁ  cation.
More speciﬁ  cally, this chapter will examine how access to shared capital-
ism, returns from shared capitalism programs, and organizational power 
and authority within companies with shared capitalism are stratiﬁ  ed by 
gender, race, ethnicity, and disability. The analysis is based on the NBER 
data set of over 40,000 employees in fourteen US companies with at least 
one type of shared capitalism program. This data set provides rich individual 
level information on participation in diﬀerent shared capitalist programs, 
ﬁ  nancial returns, and assets held in shared capitalist programs, and access 
to and perceptions of various types of power and authority.
Our knowledge of how diﬀerent groups do with respect to these outcomes 
is severely limited, as existing research on shared capitalism has largely 
ignored these issues. Gaining a better understanding of these outcomes will 
provide a richer perspective on how the returns of shared capitalism are 
distributed and the potential eﬀects of this distribution on the eﬀectiveness 
of shared capitalism. A central motivation of this chapter is to take seri-
ously the eﬀect of social inequality on employee outcomes, and the pos-
sibility that social inequality can mitigate the relationship between shared 
capitalism and corporate performance. This chapter will not examine the 
causes of stratiﬁ  cation within the sample companies, nor will it provide 
an in-  depth analysis of the consequences of shared capitalist programs for 
long-  term trends in inequality. Rather, the analysis will examine the con-
crete outcomes for diﬀerent demographic groups and thus provide a detailed 
picture of the contours of stratiﬁ  cation within shared capitalist companies. 
This chapter will also examine relationships between social stratiﬁ  cation and 
employee attitudes toward their jobs, their employers, and shared capital-
ism itself. Ultimately, another goal of this chapter is to open up a research 
and theoretical space on which future studies of stratiﬁ  cation and shared 
capitalism can build, both to better understand the long-  term impacts of 
shared capitalism on broader patterns of social inequality and to expand the 
existing theoretical frameworks on social stratiﬁ  cation to incorporate new 
forms of compensation and wealth generation in the twenty-  ﬁ  rst century 
economy.
After reviewing the existing literature on income inequality generally, this 
chapter will turn to the empirical analysis, which will ﬁ  rst examine whether 
women and diﬀerent minority groups face barriers to accessing shared capi-
talist programs. Next, the analysis will examine the eﬀect of gender, race, eth-
nicity, and disability on the value of assets that employees acquire through 
shared capitalist programs. This chapter will then analyze how power and 
authority are distributed among diﬀerent demographic groups within com-
panies with shared capitalism. Finally, I will consider the impacts of social Who Beneﬁ  ts from Shared Capitalism?    3 1 9
stratiﬁ  cation on employee attitudes and conclude with a discussion of some 
implications for management theory and practice.
Overall, the results reveal substantial disparities between the outcomes of 
women and men, nonwhite and whites, and employees with and without dis-
abilities in terms of access to shared capitalism and the ﬁ  nancial value pro-
vided by this participation. Although many of these eﬀects appear to stem 
from existing mechanisms of occupational segregation, women and African 
Americans have lower plan values, even accounting for diﬀerences in educa-
tion, occupation, and salary. This suggests that the structure and operation 
of certain forms of shared capitalism generates disparities beyond those 
created by extant mechanisms of stratiﬁ  cation. The analysis provides a more 
mixed view of barriers to power and authority because formal structures 
of employee involvement appear to open up access to workplace power for 
some groups. The ﬁ  ndings also reveal that, despite these disparities, access 
to shared capitalism and participation in employee involvement practices 
have positive eﬀects on employee attitudes among all of the demographic 
groups.
10.2    The  Persisting  Signiﬁ  cance of Gender, Race, and Ethnicity
Analyzing gaps in the economic and organizational outcomes for groups 
with diﬀerent ascriptive statuses has been a central focus of a vast literature 
on social stratiﬁ  cation in the last three decades (Morris and Western 1999). 
These analyses have focused primarily on gaps in earnings, but also on gaps 
in wealth, socioeconomic status, and power and authority within organiza-
tions. A common story emerges from this literature: in the United States, the 
postwar prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s reduced or held constant inequal-
ity levels within all demographic groups. Since the early 1970s, however, 
median earnings have declined for most groups, and in the 1980s, inequality 
accelerated rapidly, with the trend continuing through today (Morris and 
Western 1999). The lone exception is that since 1973, the real value of wages 
for women has increased across all income levels, while the real value of 
wages for most men has declined or remained constant. Women, however, 
continue to earn less than men. A recent analysis from the Economic Policy 
Institute (2006) indicates that college-  educated women earn 24 percent less 
than college- educated men, that women are disproportionately represented 
in minimum wage jobs, and that women are less likely to earn high wages 
(10.1 percent of women versus 17.6 percent of men earn at least three times 
the poverty level wage).
Similarly, although African Americans experienced increases in the real 
value of their wages in the postwar period, this trend for the most part 
stopped in the mid-  1970s, and earnings inequality has increased among 
African Americans in the last two decades (Morris and Western 1999). In 
addition, the median income for African Americans is only 55.6 percent that 320    Edward J. Carberry
of whites, and 29.4 percent of African American households, as compared 
to 13 percent of white households, have zero or negative net worth (Eco-
nomic Policy Institute 2006). Other racial and ethnic groups have not been 
the subject of as much attention as women and African Americans, but 
the overall trends reﬂ  ect similarly negative outcomes. In their analysis of 
census data from 1970, 1980, and 1990, Hirschman and Snipp (1999) found 
similarly negative eﬀects of race/  ethnicity on the socioeconomic status (a 
measure of occupational attainment) among African Americans, Hispan-
ics, and Native Americans. However, the outcomes for Asian Americans 
were equal to or greater than that of whites. In terms of earnings, all racial 
and ethnic groups, except for Japanese Americans, earned less than whites, 
and the gaps were the largest for African Americans, Hispanics, and Native 
Americans.
Explaining the diﬀerential outcomes of men and women, and of whites 
and nonwhites, has been the topic of a large body of literature on social strat-
iﬁ  cation. Reviewing this literature is beyond the scope of this chapter, but 
the evidence provides strong empirical support for the explanation that in-
equality is the result of women and minorities being consistently segregated 
into diﬀerent labor markets than men and whites, and that these labor mar-
kets consist of primarily diﬀerent (and lower-  paying) occupations (Grusky 
2001). The literature has also revealed that occupational segregation itself 
has been driven primarily by mechanisms of social closure that emanate 
from social conﬂ  ict for jobs and access to jobs, diﬀerential access to edu-
cational opportunities that are crucial for occupational attainment, and 
cultural views that devalue female and nonwhite labor (Grusky 2001). In 
addition, women and African Americans have each faced their own unique 
set of barriers. For the former, the legacy of slavery, geographic segregation, 
and the decimation of the domestic manufacturing sector have cut many 
African Americans oﬀ from educational opportunities, social networks, and 
formal labor markets (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1980). Although 
women have recently faced fewer barriers to education, they have been 
uniquely aﬀected by the devaluation of their paid labor market skills and 
abilities and relegated to a primary role as unpaid, domestic labor (Grusky 
2001).
Morris and Western (1999) have argued that despite the importance of 
these speciﬁ  c forces shaping access to economic opportunities for diﬀerent 
groups, all groups have been signiﬁ  cantly and similarly aﬀected by some 
common recent trends. In the last two decades demographic forces, such as 
the rise of the baby boomers, the increase in the number of women entering 
the workforce, and an increase in the number of unskilled immigrants, have 
all increased the supply of available workers. These demographic changes 
have coincided with deindustrialization, globalization, the decline of unions, 
the rise of market- based employment relations (e.g., contract work, subcon-
tracting, temporary employment), and the expansion of the service sector, Who Beneﬁ  ts from Shared Capitalism?    3 2 1
which provides lower paying jobs with fewer beneﬁ  ts for unskilled workers 
than the manufacturing jobs that they replaced.
The empirical evidence on inequality in the United States, therefore, pre-
sents a sobering account of the reality of equal access to economic oppor-
tunity. The persistence of inequality produces a range of negative economic 
and social consequences for all demographic groups, but serious solutions 
remain politically anathema at this stage. In the absence of new legisla-
tion to both mitigate these outcomes and address root causes, as well as 
large-  scale cultural shifts in attitudes about the legitimacy and function of 
inequality, these patterns are likely to continue. In the last three decades, 
however, the diﬀusion of shared capitalism programs has opened up new 
avenues of economic opportunity since these programs provide a way for 
employees to access a source of income and wealth beyond their ﬁ  xed pay; 
that is, through the ownership of stock and direct sharing of proﬁ  ts of their 
employing companies. Broadening capital ownership and proﬁ  t sharing to 
groups earning less in the labor market may, therefore, help reduce income 
and wealth inequality. However, since access to these plans and the value 
that employees receive are often a direct function of income and occupation, 
shared capitalism may also exacerbate existing patterns of income inequal-
ity even as it increases the wealth of lower paid employees. Although the 
shared capitalism data analyzed in the chapter does not allow us to test these 
claims directly, it does allow us to gain a better understanding of inequality 
relating to participation in, and the value generated by, shared capitalism. 
I now turn to the evidence presented by the NBER data set of companies 
with shared capitalism.
10.3    Data  and  Methodology
This chapter uses the NBER data set of employees in fourteen ﬁ  rms with 
shared capitalism plans, described in the “Studying Shared Capitalism” sec-
tion of the introduction to this volume. The focus of the statistical analyses 
is on examining the eﬀect of being in one of six demographic categories 
(female, African American, Hispanic, Asian American, Native American, 
and having a disability) on a number of outcomes relating to access to shared 
capitalism, the ﬁ  nancial value of shared capitalism, and access to organi-
zational power. The analyses compare outcomes of women to men, each 
nonwhite group to whites, and employees with disabilities to those without 
disabilities. For example, when compared to men, are women more or less 
likely to participate in shared capitalism? Statistically, such comparisons 
are accomplished through the use of general linear regression models, and 
more speciﬁ  cally, logit and ordered logit models. In terms of reporting, the 
results for the logit and ordered logit models report coeﬃcients rather than 
odds ratios. The only exception to the logit and ordered logit approach is 
in the analysis for ﬁ  nancial value of shared capitalism, which uses ordinary 322    Edward J. Carberry
least squares (OLS) regression. For this analysis, all outcomes were coded 
so that higher values represent more positive outcomes. For example, the 
answers for the question, “how much inﬂ  uence do you have in deciding how 
you do your job and organize your work?” were “1  a lot, 2  some, 3  only 
a little, 4  none.” These responses were reversed coded for the analysis.
For all outcomes relating to shared capitalism and workplace power, I 
report results for two models. The ﬁ  rst includes the demographic variables of 
interest and controls for ﬁ  rm level eﬀects. The second also includes controls 
(coeﬃcients unreported) for occupation, education, organizational tenure, 
ﬁ  xed pay, wealth, and individual ﬁ  rms, all of which may have an impact on 
the outcomes. Of particular interest is modeling the eﬀects of occupation. 
A large body of a sociological research has demonstrated that an impor-
tant driver of income inequality is the consistent segregation of women 
and racial and ethnic minorities into diﬀerent labor markets than men and 
whites, labor markets that consist of primarily diﬀerent (and lower-  paying) 
occupations (Grusky 2001). Such segregation may be important for shared 
capitalism outcomes if women and nonwhites are more likely to be in occu-
pations that are less likely to participate in shared capitalism. For example, 
if the results indicate that women are less likely to participate in shared 
capitalism, but the models do not control for occupation, this eﬀect may be 
due to the fact that women could be segregated into occupations that have 
restricted access to shared capitalism, rather than due to something unique 
about how organizations structure shared capitalism plans.
In fact, conﬁ  rming the evidence from past research, there is strong evi-
dence of occupational segregation by gender, race, ethnicity, and disability 
status among employees in the sample. Appendix table 10A.1 shows results 
from logit models predicting the eﬀect of demographic characteristics on 
the likelihood of being in diﬀerent occupations, controlling for ﬁ  rm level 
diﬀerences, among employees in the sample. All groups are less likely to be 
in management positions, which have better access to shared capitalism and 
workplace power. The same is true for professional/ technical positions, with 
the exception of Asian Americans. Therefore, controlling for occupation will 
permit a more nuanced understanding of the potential sources of dispari-
ties between diﬀerent groups; that is, do disparities stem from occupational 
segregation and/  or the speciﬁ  c ways in which shared capitalism plans are 
structured? In considering the results that account for occupational segrega-
tion, however, it is important to recognize that the occupational categories 
are broad. Although more ﬁ  ne grained occupational categories would have 
permitted a more detailed analysis of the role of occupational segregation, 
the survey did not collect data on more detailed occupational categories. In 
addition to the aforementioned controls, for all outcomes, I examined the 
impact of these demographic statuses for younger employees (under forty). 
I also ran models that included interaction terms to examine the eﬀect of 
gender and race/  ethnicity together. I do not report results for these models Who Beneﬁ  ts from Shared Capitalism?    3 2 3
in the tables, but highlight the notable ﬁ  ndings in the discussion. Finally, the 
results highlighted in the subsequent discussion focus on those eﬀects that 
were statistically signiﬁ  cant at least at the p  .05 level. The discussion of 
the results, to which this chapter now turns, is intended to illuminate overall 
trends and patterns and not discuss every ﬁ  nding in detail.
10.4    Descriptive  Statistics
Before exploring the inﬂ  uence of gender, race, ethnicity, and disability on 
access to and returns from shared capitalism, table 10.1 provides summary 
information about the demographic characteristics of the sample, including 
participation rates in shared capitalism plans, values of shared capitalism 
assets, salary, and wealth.1
On all measures, men do better than women. Men have a higher rate of 
participation in employee ownership, proﬁ  t sharing, and gain sharing, as 
well as higher average values for employee ownership assets, salary, and 
wealth. In terms of race and ethnicity, whites have the best outcomes on 
most measures, with the exception of Asian Americans, who have the high-
est average values for shared capitalism assets and salary, and the highest 
participation rates in gain- sharing plans. African Americans have the lowest 
value of shared capitalist assets and wealth, while Hispanics have the low-
est average participation in shared capitalism and lowest average salaries. 
To gain a better understanding of the signiﬁ  cance and magnitude of these 
diﬀerences, this chapter now turns to a deeper analysis of shared capitalism 
outcomes for various demographic groups.
In the discussion that follows, I focus on those results that are statistically 
signiﬁ  cant. However, it is important to note that the number of employees 
within each demographic group may inﬂ  uence the statistical signiﬁ  cance of 
some of the ﬁ  ndings. For example, there are only 460 Native Americans in 
the sample, compared to almost 12,000 women. These sample sizes mean 
that the standard errors for women are lower, and this makes it easy to estab-
lish statistical signiﬁ  cance. This also means that there will be little discussion 
of the outcomes of Native Americans. This does not necessarily mean that 
Native Americans do not experience disparities in various outcomes, but 
that statistically, it is diﬃcult to establish relationships between being Native 
American and the outcomes of primary interest. Also, the sample sizes for 
African Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and employees with dis-
abilities are similar, so making comparisons of signiﬁ  cant diﬀerences among 
these groups are relatively easy. Making comparisons between these groups 
and women, however, should be made with some caution.
1. Wealth is deﬁ  ned as total assets minus debts. More speciﬁ  cally, respondents were asked to 
report their wealth by including the “value of their house minus the mortgage, plus their ve-
hicles, stocks and mutual funds, cash, checking accounts, retirement accounts including 401(k) 
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10.5      Access to Shared Capitalist Programs
Do rates of participation in shared capitalism programs vary between 
diﬀerent demographic groups? If rates do vary, to what extent and why? 
Table 10.2 shows the results of logit regression models that predict the eﬀect 
of gender, race, ethnicity, and disability status on participation in the six pri-
mary types of shared capitalist programs that were measured by the NBER 
survey. The models examined participation rates only among those employ-
ees who were eligible for speciﬁ  c plans, not for the entire sample. For example, 
the models that examine participation rates for broad-  based stock option 
plans only include employees in companies that had such plans, rather than 
for the entire sample. For each plan, the table reports the results from two 
models: the ﬁ  rst includes only the demographic variables and controls for 
ﬁ  rm eﬀects, and the second includes these variables along with additional 
controls for occupation, education, tenure, income, and wealth. Interpret-
ing the logit coeﬃcients requires a mathematical transformation known as 
exponentiation. This transformation yields a new number known as an odds 
ratio, which compares the odds that a woman will participate in an Employee 
Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) to the odds that a man will participate in 
an ESOP. For example, the coeﬃcient for women participating in ESOPs 
(without controls) is – .157, which when transformed yields an odds ratio of 
.85. Hence, women are 15 percent less likely to participate in ESOPs. Table 
10.4 reports the results from table 10.2 in this more digestible form.
When examining the results for plan participation, it is essential to keep in 
mind the rules governing diﬀerent forms of shared capitalism. ESOPs are 
governed by federal legislation that requires that most employees participate. 
For other types of shared capitalism plans, such as broad-  based employee 
stock option plans (BBSOPs), proﬁ  t sharing, and gain sharing, management 
decides who will participate among employees who are eligible. For still 
other forms of shared capitalism, such as employee stock purchase plans 
(ESPPs) and 401(k) plans, employees themselves decide whether or not they 
will participate. For these last two types of plans, the law requires that most 
employees are eligible (for example, ESPPs must be available to all full- time 
employees with two years of service), but employees ultimately have the 
choice of whether or not they will participate.
Table 10.2 indicates that women, African Americans, and employees with 
disabilities are less likely to participate in ESOPs. However, these eﬀects all 
become statistically insigniﬁ  cant with controls of occupation, education, 
tenure, and ﬁ  xed pay, indicating that the eﬀects in these ﬁ  rst models are likely 
the result of existing patterns of occupational segregation. Two other signiﬁ  -
cant ﬁ  ndings, unreported in table 10.2, are that both African American men 
and men with disabilities are less likely to participate in ESOPs. Any ﬁ  ndings 
that reveal barriers to ESOP participation, however, are notable because of 
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those employees who work part time, and these groups may be more likely 
to work part time.
The results for BBSOPs and ESPPs reveal few group disparities in par-
ticipation rates. In fact, Asian Americans are more likely to participate in 
ESPPs, and women are more likely to receive stock options, even with con-
trols for occupation, education, and tenure. In terms of the groups that do 
face barriers, although African Americans are less likely to receive stock 
options and participate in ESPPs, these eﬀects disappear when controls are 
included. Men with disabilities, however, are less likely to receive stock op-
tions. For 401(k) plans, all groups except women are less likely to participate, 
but the eﬀects for African Americans and employees with disabilities are 
the only ones that remain with controls for occupation and education. The 
results show that access is most restricted for proﬁ  t- sharing plans, as African 
Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans are less likely to participate, 
even with controls. Although these same groups, plus Native Americans, 
are less likely to participate in gain-  sharing plans, only the eﬀects for Asian 
Americans remain with controls.
We can view the results according to which groups have the worst out-
comes and how access to speciﬁ  c plans varies. Overall, African Americans 
and Asian Americans have the worst outcomes. In terms of speciﬁ  c plans, 
the most notable diﬀerence is that while there are disparities in participa-
tion rates for all plans, for ESOPs, stock options, and ESPPs, most of these 
appear to be due to existing patterns of occupational segregation. For par-
ticipation in 401(k), proﬁ  t-  sharing, and gain-  sharing plans, while there are 
similar disparities resulting from occupational segregation, the results also 
show that the ways in which companies structure and operate these plans 
generate additional disparities. One possible explanation lies in the ways 
in which decisions regarding participation are made. In proﬁ  t-  sharing and 
gain-  sharing plans, for example, management decides who will participate. 
The disparities for virtually all nonwhites in the former may reﬂ  ect subtle 
mechanisms of discrimination, social closure, or work devaluation in the 
decision-  making process. However, the decisions regarding stock option 
plan participation are also with management, and only one group, men with 
disabilities, face restricted access, so this issue requires further research. In 
addition, African Americans and employees with disabilities are less likely 
to participate in 401(k) plans, but women are more likely to participate. With 
this form of shared capitalism, employees choose whether to participate. 
The lower levels of participation for these two groups may be related to 
their lower levels of pay and wealth; that is, employees in these two groups 
may be less willing and able to ﬁ  nancially invest for the future given their 
lower current pay levels. However, other groups that face similar constraints, 
such as women and other minority groups, do not have similarly restricted 
access. The lower levels of participation in 401(k) plans for these groups 
may also reﬂ  ect diﬀerent knowledge levels about these plans or diﬀerent atti-
tudes toward retirement saving. Future research is necessary to determine 328    Edward J. Carberry
the types of speciﬁ  c mechanisms that shape stratiﬁ  cation patterns in access. 
Whether participation is determined by management or employees may be 
one important factor, but may not be the only one.
In considering the results for participation in shared capitalist plans, 
stratiﬁ  cation in participation rates appears to be shaped primarily by exist-
ing mechanisms of stratiﬁ  cation, which place women and minorities into 
occupational and income groups for which access to shared capitalism is 
restricted. For example, employees in production jobs are less likely to par-
ticipate in ESPPs and African Americans are more likely to be in production 
jobs. The exceptions to this are 401(k) plans, proﬁ  t sharing, and gain shar-
ing, in which some minorities face additional barriers beyond occupational 
status, education, and income level. Moreover, the results indicate that those 
employees that have higher incomes are more likely to participate in shared 
capitalism. To take a closer look at the wealth employees receive through 
these plans, I now turn to an analysis of the ﬁ  nancial value that diﬀerent 
groups receive through shared capitalism plans.
10.6      Financial Value of Shared Capitalism
Of those employees who participate in shared capitalist programs, do 
diﬀerent groups receive diﬀerent levels of returns? To answer this ques-
tion, I examined the eﬀect of being in diﬀerent demographic groups on the 
value of shared capitalism. Table 10.3 shows the results of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) models that predict the natural logarithm of plan assets. I 
only included those employees who participated in these plans. To the extent 
that certain groups are less likely to participate in certain plans, therefore, 
the eﬀects for all employees within these groups who work in these compa-
nies is likely understated. For example, African Americans are less likely to 
participate in proﬁ  t-  sharing plans. If those who participate in these plans 
have signiﬁ  cantly negative values for proﬁ  t sharing, the overall diﬀerence in 
value of proﬁ  t sharing for African Americans—combining lower participa-
tion and lower values for those who do participate—would be large. Similar 
to the results for plan participation, the table reports results from two sets 
of models. The ﬁ  rst includes just the demographic variables and ﬁ  rm-  level 
dummies. The second include controls for occupation, education, ﬁ  xed pay, 
and wealth and individual ﬁ  rms.
The models in table 10.3 regress the independent variables on the natural 
logarithm of the ﬁ  nancial value held or received from the various forms of 
shared capitalism. I used log transformations to control for the eﬀects of 
outliers. The speciﬁ  c dependent variables for which I used the logged trans-
formation include:
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•   BBSOP: total stock option value, or, the sum of the money an employee 
would receive if they exercised all vested and unvested stock options 
at the time of the survey (net of purchase price) plus the value of the 
stock currently held by employees from exercising any stock options, 
plus the amount of money an employee has made from exercising any 
stock options, from the company in the past and selling the shares.
•   ESPPs: total value of company stock an employee owns from pur-
chases of stock made through an ESPP.
•   401(k): total value of company stock an employee holds through a 
401(k) plan.
•   Proﬁ  t sharing: value of payments an employee received in the previous 
year from a proﬁ  t-  sharing plan.
•   Gain  sharing: value of payments an employee received in the previous 
year based on work group or department performance.
The value of stock acquired in most shared capitalist plans is linked directly 
to salary, so we should ﬁ  nd that stratiﬁ  cation in these values reﬂ  ects existing 
patterns of income stratiﬁ  cation shown in table 10.1.
Since the results in table 10.3 are for ordinary least squares regressions, 
the coeﬃcients are interpreted diﬀerently than the logit coeﬃcients for plan 
participation reported in table 10.2. Table 10.4 shows the results of table 
10.3 with the statistically signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcients transformed to percentage 
diﬀerentials, providing an easier way to assess the magnitudes of the dispari-
ties in the ﬁ  nancial value of shared capitalism for diﬀerent groups.
In comparison to the ﬁ  ndings regarding access to shared capitalism, the 
results for ﬁ  nancial value reveal more negative outcomes for women, non-
whites, and employees with disabilities. For ESOPs, women, African Ameri-
cans, and Hispanics receive less value than their comparison groups (men 
and whites). For BBSOPs and ESPPs, these groups plus Asian Americans 
receive less value. For these three plans, once controls are added for occu-
pation, education, tenure, ﬁ  xed pay, and wealth, many of the signiﬁ  cant 
eﬀects drop out. This suggests that the lower plan values for these plans 
are mostly due to existing patterns of occupational segregation and educa-
tional attainment, as well as lower levels of ﬁ  xed pay. A notable exception 
is women, who have signiﬁ  cantly lower plan values than men, even when 
controlling for these variables. For 401(k) plans, proﬁ  t sharing, and gain 
sharing, all groups have lower plan values in the models without controls 
for occupation, education, and income, and more of these eﬀects remain 
with controls, relative to the three plans discussed ﬁ  rst. For example, these 
eﬀects remain for 401(k) plans for all groups except Native Americans and 
employees with disabilities. These eﬀects also remain for women and African 
Americans for both proﬁ  t-  sharing and gain-  sharing plans. Overall, women 
have the worst outcomes, followed by African Americans. Women receive 
lower ﬁ  nancial values through all type of plans, even after controlling for 
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What accounts for these ﬁ  ndings? For some plans, the disparities in the 
ﬁ  nancial value of shared capitalism for certain demographic groups are 
primarily due to the existing mechanisms of stratiﬁ  cation, such as occu-
pational segregation that leads to certain groups earning less income. For 
other plans, the way in which companies structure and operate them creates 
additional disparities. What speciﬁ  cally in the plan design and operation 
of 401(k), proﬁ  t- sharing, and gain- sharing plans leads to these disparities? 
For plans in which management decides how much employees receive, these 
disparities could be the results of subtle forms of work devaluation and 
discrimination. For 401(k) plans, the disparities could stem from certain 
groups of employees having lower levels of discretionary income for invest-
ing in these plans. On the whole, the results suggest that shared capitalism 
plans may not be altering existing patterns of income and wealth stratiﬁ  -
cation and could be exacerbating these gaps, since those employees with 
higher salaries are more likely to participate and receive more ﬁ  nancial 
value through shared capitalism. This is not surprising given that the way 
in which these plans allocate value is based on some formula of pay. Testing 
the long-  term impact of shared capitalism on existing patterns of income 
and wealth stratiﬁ  cation more completely, however, will require compar-
ing outcomes within a group of similar employees in similar organizations 
without shared capitalism, which is beyond the more modest scope of this 
chapter.
10.7      Access to Power and Authority
In addition to access to income and wealth, access to power and authority 
in the workplace are important dimensions of social stratiﬁ  cation. Power 
and authority at the job, work group, department, and company level can 
be a source of status, prestige, and well-  being, as well as a source of occu-
pational and income attainment (Smith 2002). Brass (2002) deﬁ  nes power 
in the workplace as the opposite of dependency, deriving from control of 
critical resources on which others are dependent, along with the ability to 
recognize this position and act upon it. Power can be formal—residing in 
the hierarchy of positions—and informal, emanating from the myriad ways 
in which employees can control access to resources through structural posi-
tions in social networks and personality traits. In addition, over the last three 
decades, a number of companies have implemented various practices that 
broaden decision- making authority by providing employees with structured 
ways to have input into company, department, work group, and job level 
decisions (Osterman 2001).
In reviewing the research on racial and gender diﬀerences in the attain-
ment of workplace authority, Smith (2002, 534) found that “men are more 
likely than women to have authority, and employer behaviors and organiza-
tional policies are more important than women’s attitudes and behaviors in Who Beneﬁ  ts from Shared Capitalism?    3 3 3
explaining the gender gap in authority.” For race and ethnicity, Smith (2002, 
528–  29) concludes that:
“The literature documents important racial diﬀerences in the authority 
attainment of the two groups most studied—blacks and whites. Major 
conclusions point to systematic discriminatory practices in the processes 
that lead to authority and in the amount of ﬁ  nancial returns that blacks 
receive for occupying positions of authority similar to those of whites.”
Hence, the research on the stratiﬁ  cation of power within the workplace 
has found similar outcomes and explanations for the outcomes of women 
and African Americans as the literature on income inequality. Do women, 
diﬀerent racial and ethnic groups, and employees with disabilities face barri-
ers to accessing power and authority in companies with shared capitalism, or 
do these groups fare better within these companies? These questions become 
more salient in light of numerous studies (NCEO 2006) that have found that 
shared capitalism has the most signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on corporate performance 
when it is combined with signiﬁ  cant levels of employee involvement through 
practices such as work teams, oﬄine employee committees that make deci-
sions on such issues as quality and safety, and formal training programs. 
This suggests that shared capitalism companies may have a high incidence 
of power-  sharing practices relating to employee involvement.
The NBER survey collected data on a number of measures of power and 
authority in the workplace, and hence provides a way to begin examining 
some of these issues. In this chapter, I focus on two sets of measures. The 
ﬁ  rst set includes what might be called traditional measures of power: access 
to management and supervisory positions, intensity of supervision, promo-
tions, and job security. The second set of measures incorporates the eﬀects 
of practices associated with employee involvement: perceptions of inﬂ  uence 
on job, department, and company level decisions; access to self-  directed 
work teams and oﬄine employee committees; diﬀerent forms of training; 
and job rotation. In the last two decades, there has been a gradual increase 
in the number of companies using these practices (Osterman 2001), and 
they represent alternative ways in which employees can exercise power and 
inﬂ  uence over decisions, co-  workers, and the control of resources. Taken 
together, the results from both sets of measures of power and authority 
reveal some similar patterns of stratiﬁ  cation as those relating to access to 
and the value of shared capitalism programs, but there are also some impor-
tant diﬀerences.
10.8      Power and Authority: Management, Supervision, 
Promotions, and Job Security
Table 10.5 shows results for models that predict the eﬀect of demographic 
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include controls for education, tenure, and ﬁ  rm eﬀects. Table 10.5 also shows 
results for models predicting employee perceptions of supervision, promo-
tions, and job security. For each of the last three outcomes, table 10.5 shows 
the results from two models. The ﬁ  rst includes controls for ﬁ  rm level eﬀects, 
while the second adds controls for occupation, education, and tenure.
I used logit models to predict the likelihood of employees being in diﬀer-
ent managerial positions because the dependent variable was binary (“yes” 
or “no” response). I used ordered logit models to predict the likelihood 
of diﬀerent responses on the questions regarding supervision, promotion, 
and job security because these dependent variables had more than two pos-
sible outcomes. Interpreting these coeﬃcients requires a similar process as 
interpreting the logit coeﬃcients in table 10.2. For example, the coeﬃcient 
for African Americans and closeness of supervision is .501. Exponentiating 
this yields an odds ratio of 0.55, indicating that African Americans are 45 
percent less likely, on average, to report higher scores on this question; that 
is, they are less likely to report freedom from close supervision.
The results from table 10.5 reveal that women and Asian Americans are 
less likely to be in management roles, and that nonwhite employees and 
employees with disabilities are more likely to report close supervision, fewer 
promotions, and less job security. For the last three ﬁ  ndings, most of the 
results remain with controls for occupation, education, and tenure. Women, 
Asian Americans, and employees with disabilities have the worst outcomes. 
Women, for example, are less likely to be represented in all levels of manage-
ment and are less likely to be promoted. Asian Americans are less likely to 
be in all levels of management, are more likely to be closely supervised, less 
likely to be promoted, and report lower job security. Employees with dis-
abilities are less likely to be supervisors and have negative outcomes on all 
other measures. All groups except Hispanics are less likely to be promoted, 
and although all groups except women report less job security, this eﬀect 
drops for Hispanics and Native Americans once controls for occupation, 
education, and tenure are included.
Overall, the results on this ﬁ  rst set of measures of power and authority 
suggest that women, nonwhites, and employees with disabilities face signiﬁ  -
cant barriers to accessing workplace power. These ﬁ  ndings are not surprising 
because they reﬂ  ect broader patterns in the stratiﬁ  cation of workplace power 
and authority (Smith 2002). The results show that the mechanisms that 
lead to these outcomes also operate within shared capitalism companies. 
The ﬁ  ndings raise some interesting questions. Why do women and Asian 
Americans face similar barriers to entering management, while other groups 
appear not to? Why do nonwhite employees and employees with disabilities 
have similarly negative outcomes regarding close supervision and job secu-
rity? Why do women and most nonwhite employees receive fewer promo-
tions? How do these groups fare with respect to other forms of power and 
authority? This chapter now turns to examining this last question.336    Edward J. Carberry
10.9      Power and Authority: Employee Involvement 
in Decision Making and Training
The NBER survey also included a number of questions relating to other 
dimensions of power, including perceptions about the level of inﬂ  uence over 
diﬀerent types of decisions, access to diﬀerent types of teams and employee 
committees, access to diﬀerent types of training, and participation in job 
rotation. These outcomes reﬂ  ect diﬀerent dimensions of power than those 
discussed in the previous section. Do women and minorities face similar 
barriers to power and authority through these practices and are employee 
involvement practices opening up new avenues of power for these groups? 
Table 10.6 reports results from models predicting the eﬀect of gender, race, 
ethnicity, and disability on the likelihood of employees participating in these 
practices.
The ﬁ  rst three models examine the likelihood that employees in diﬀerent 
demographic groups reported having inﬂ  uence on, respectively, decisions 
at the company level, setting goals for their department or work group, and 
decisions about how to do their jobs. For each of these questions, respon-
dents were asked how much involvement they had over decisions at these 
three diﬀerent levels using a scale of 1 to 4, coded here as 1  “none” and 
4  “a lot.” I used ordered logit models to predict the eﬀects of diﬀerent 
demographic characteristics on diﬀerent responses. The next three mod-
els examine the likelihood that employees in these diﬀerent groups will be 
involved in, respectively, employee committees, self-  directed teams, and 
eﬀorts to develop innovative products or services. These dependent vari-
ables for these models were binary, and I therefore used logit models. Positive 
coeﬃcients mean more involvement. The last three models examine the like-
lihood that employees in diﬀerent demographic groups will receive formal 
training (yes or no), receive informal job training from peers (scale of 1 to 
4, with 1 being “not at all” and 4 being “to a great extent”), and participate 
in job rotation eﬀorts (scale of 1 to 3, with 1 being “never” and 3 being “fre-
quently”). Hence, for the last three outcomes, positive coeﬃcients mean that 
employees are more likely to be involved in these practices.
For each of the employee involvement outcomes, table 10.6 reports results 
from two models, the ﬁ  rst with only ﬁ  rm level controls, and the second 
with controls for occupation, education, tenure, and individual ﬁ  rms. In the 
models without controls, women, African Americans, and employees with 
disabilities have the lowest levels of involvement. Women for example, are 
less likely to be involved in all practices, except for informal training and 
job rotation. African Americans are less likely to be involved in all prac-
tices except for company level decisions and job rotation. Employees with 
disabilities are less likely to be involved in all practices, except for job rota-
tion. Some of the negative outcomes for these three groups disappear with 
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women are more likely to participate in department and job level decisions. 
This suggests that women are more likely to be in jobs that are not involved 
in such eﬀorts, but that once this is controlled for, women are actually more 
likely to be involved. Similarly, once controls are added, African Americans 
are more likely to participate in company level decisions and formal training 
eﬀorts. Also, the negative eﬀects for department level decisions, oﬄine com-
mittees, and innovation eﬀorts disappear (but do not become positive) for 
African Americans with controls. For employees with disabilities, the nega-
tive eﬀects disappear for involvement in company level decisions, employee 
committees, and innovation eﬀorts.
Hispanics appear to have the best access to employee involvement prac-
tices. In the models with controls, they are more likely to participate in 
company and department level decisions, self-  directed work teams, formal 
training, and job rotation. They are only less likely to participate in infor-
mal training eﬀorts. Asian Americans, however, have mixed outcomes. For 
models with controls, they are more likely to participate in company level 
decisions, self-  directed work teams, innovation eﬀorts, and job rotation. 
They are, however, less likely to participate in departmental and job level 
decisions, employee committees, and informal training. For both Hispanics 
and Asian Americans, there are similar patterns for the models with and 
without controls for occupation, education, and tenure.
In terms of speciﬁ  c practices (with controls), there are some interesting 
patterns. Nonwhite employees are more likely to participate in company 
level decisions, but all nonwhite groups are also less likely to participate in 
job level decisions. For self-  directed work teams, the results are mixed, as 
women, African Americans, and employees with disabilities are less likely 
to be involved, while Hispanics and Asians are more likely. Asian Ameri-
cans are the only group more likely to participate in innovation eﬀorts, and 
all groups except women are less likely to participate in informal training. 
Finally, all groups are more likely to participate in job rotation.
Overall, the results for the second set of power outcomes reveal that work-
place practices relating to employee involvement appear to open up at least 
some avenues of power for women, nonwhites, and employees with dis-
abilities. There are fewer disparities, in comparison to the ﬁ  rst set of power 
measures, and all groups, except employees with disabilities, are actually 
more likely to participate in at least some practices. These ﬁ  ndings raise a 
number of questions for future research. Why are certain groups less likely 
to participate in job level decisions and self-  directed teams? Why are cer-
tain groups more likely to participate in company level decisions? Why do 
Hispanics have the best outcomes? Why do women and African Americans 
do the worst? Why are most groups less likely to receive informal training 
opportunities? Why are all groups more likely to participate in job rota-
tion programs? One possible explanation for some of the ﬁ  ndings discussed 
here is that formalized practices, such as self-  directed teams, may require 340    Edward J. Carberry
equal access. In contrast, less formal practices, such as informal on-  the-
  job training, may create opportunities for certain types of employees to 
be excluded. Only future research will be able to test the validity of these 
types of explanations. Gaining a better understanding of the workplace 
level mechanisms through which certain groups are excluded from diﬀerent 
involvement practices is essential to understanding how access to power 
and authority within these companies is stratiﬁ  ed. The results presented 
here provide a strong case that such mechanisms are in operation, but also 
that access to employee involvement practices appears to be open for more 
diverse types of employees.
10.10      Putting the Pieces Together
What do the overall patterns of stratiﬁ  cation look like in shared capitalist 
companies? Table 10.7 summarizes the outcomes for diﬀerent demographic 
groups. The percentages in each cell represent the percentages of statistically 
signiﬁ  cant negative coeﬃcients for all outcomes within each of the four sets 
of variables discussed before: access to shared capitalism, value of assets in 
shared capitalism, and the two sets of power measures. Negative coeﬃcients 
represent disparities in outcomes between speciﬁ  c demographic groups and 
their comparison groups (men for women, whites for each nonwhite group, 
and employees without disabilities for employees with disabilities). The 
qualitative assessment is based on the following broad categories: few dis-
parities (0 to 33 percent negative outcomes), some disparities (34 percent 
to 66 percent), and many disparities (67 percent to 100 percent). The table 
shows the overall patterns for all outcomes both with and without controls 
for occupation, education, and tenure.
This table provides a concise way to assess overall outcomes for women, 
racial and ethnic minorities, and employees with disabilities. For participa-
tion in shared capitalism plans, although all groups experience at least some 
disparities in participation rates, many of these attenuate in the models that 
include controls for education, occupation, ﬁ  xed pay, and tenure. African 
Americans have the highest percentage of disparities both with and without 
controls. In terms of the ﬁ  nancial value held in shared capitalism plans, most 
groups experience many disparities in outcomes, but these eﬀects attenu-
ate with controls, with the exception of women and African Americans. 
Hence, many of the disparities that employees in these groups experience, 
with respect to participating in shared capitalism and the ﬁ  nancial value of 
shared capitalism, are the result of existing processes of occupational segre-
gation and income inequality. African Americans and women, however, still 
have relatively high percentages of disparities, even with controls.
For the ﬁ  rst set of power and authority outcomes (access to management, 
level of supervision, promotions, and job security), most groups experi-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.342    Edward J. Carberry
 presence of controls mitigates these disparities somewhat for African Ameri-
cans and greatly for Hispanics, but they remain relatively high for women, 
Asian Americans, and employees with disabilities. Out of all the four sets of 
measures, this set of power and authority measures has the highest overall 
percentages of disparate outcomes. For access to power and authority via 
employee involvement practices, the percentages of disparities are lower, 
suggesting that these practices are opening up avenues of power for many 
demographic groups. There are, however, many disparities for women, Afri-
can Americans, and employees with disabilities in the ﬁ  rst sets of models. 
Some of the percentages drop when controls are added, suggesting that these 
disparities are the result of these groups being segregated into occupations 
that have lower levels of participation in these plans. Moreover, as previously 
noted, most groups have at least some positive outcomes on this second set 
of power measures. Women, Asian Americans, and employees with disabili-
ties all have some disparities when controls are added.
The last column provides a summary measure for each group by list-
ing the percentage of disparities for all twenty-  seven measures. For models 
without controls, African Americans have the highest percentage of nega-
tive outcomes overall, followed by Hispanics, women, and employees with 
disabilities. For the models with controls, women have the highest percent-
age of disparities, followed by Asian Americans and African Americans. 
Although Asian Americans have few disparities for shared capitalist out-
comes, they have a higher percentage of disparities with respect to workplace 
power, particularly with respect to the ﬁ  rst set of measures. The pattern for 
employees with disabilities is similar. Hispanics have a low percentage of 
negative outcomes across all outcomes. Hence, women and African Ameri-
cans experience the most disparities in outcomes relating to shared capital-
ism and access to power, followed by Asian Americans and employees with 
disabilities.
Overall, the number of disparities is lowest with respect to accessing 
shared capitalism and accessing power through employee involvement prac-
tices. However, the data reveal clear disparities in how shared capitalism 
plans allocate stock, proﬁ  ts, and other ﬁ  nancial returns between diﬀerent 
groups. The data also suggest that women, nonwhites, and employees with 
disabilities face more barriers to accessing traditional measures of power 
than new forms of power through employee involvement practices. Finally, 
although the results provide strong evidence that these disparities are impor-
tantly shaped by occupational segregation, the speciﬁ  c ways in which shared 
capitalism and workplace power are structured also have important eﬀects 
on the stratiﬁ  cation of outcomes for diﬀerent demographic groups, indepen-
dent of existing patterns of occupational segregation.
The results of this analysis provide a strong case that, with respect to 
access to shared capitalism and the value of assets held in these plans, the 
outcomes are very similar to existing patterns of inequality. To the extent Who Beneﬁ  ts from Shared Capitalism?    3 4 3
that the value of assets provided by shared capitalism is linked to existing 
compensation systems, which themselves are stratiﬁ  ed by gender, race, eth-
nicity, and disability, this is not surprising. In addition, the ways in which 
companies structure certain types of plans leads to additional disparities. 
For 401(k) plans, for example, these disparities may stem from the fact that 
lower income groups, in which women and minorities are overrepresented, 
have relatively low levels of discretionary income to invest. The barriers that 
African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans face to accessing proﬁ  t 
sharing and gain sharing, however, is a pattern that needs to be researched 
in more detail, as it is the only form of nonvoluntary shared capitalism 
and management choosing who participates that seems to be shaped by 
mechanisms not operating at the occupational or income level. It is clear 
that the unequal access to these plans and the lower value of the assets held 
in these plans by women and African Americans serves as a reminder that 
these groups still face strong barriers to accessing economic opportunities 
relative to men and whites.
In terms of the stratiﬁ  cation of organizational power in shared capital-
ist companies, the evidence is more mixed. Overall, the stratiﬁ  cation of 
outcomes relating to organizational power reﬂ  ects the generally restricted 
access to these forms of power that past research has found in samples of 
companies without shared capitalism (Smith 2002). Hence, companies with 
shared capitalism do not appear to be opening up access to these forms of 
power, and the mechanisms that create these inequalities are likely deeply 
entrenched. Women and all minority groups on the whole have restricted 
access to formal power through management positions and are more closely 
supervised. However, the evidence on access to inﬂ  uence over decision mak-
ing, self- directed work teams, employee committees, training opportunities, 
and job rotation in these companies reveals that these practices appear to 
open up power for most groups.
Future research on stratiﬁ  cation of organizational power, therefore, needs 
to closely examine the actual processes through which workplace innova-
tions are implemented and become institutionalized, and how these interact 
with existing stratiﬁ  cation mechanisms. A reasonable conjecture is that since 
employee involvement practices are usually implemented at a speciﬁ  c point 
in time, they are more visible, and hence the ability of management and other 
groups to exclude certain types of people may be more diﬃcult. The social 
forces shaping access to power through management positions, individual 
autonomy, promotions, and job security are more complex and subtle, and 
hence may be more resilient to signiﬁ  cant changes in the short term. Finally, 
an important question is whether participation rates in employee involve-
ment practices within shared capitalism companies diﬀers from rates in com-
panies without shared capitalism. Our understanding of these anomalies 
and the overall trends will beneﬁ  t greatly from future research that examines 
more deeply the direct ways in which existing mechanisms of stratiﬁ  cation 344    Edward J. Carberry
shape shared capitalist outcomes, and how employee involvement practices 
alter the distribution of power and authority in the workplace and other 
levels of organizational decision making.
10.11      Employee Attitudes and Social Stratiﬁ  cation
One could argue that the patterns of stratiﬁ  cation discussed previously are 
not surprising, since they reﬂ  ect similar stratiﬁ  cation patterns in the wider 
economy and society. This certainly appears to be the case, and the question 
of whether or not such stratiﬁ  cation is good, bad, or meaningless is beyond 
both the scope and intention of this chapter. More practically, what do 
these stratiﬁ  cation outcomes mean for the eﬀectiveness of shared capitalist 
programs, the quality of work life, and corporate performance? This ques-
tion is important because companies spend signiﬁ  cant resources designing, 
implementing, and maintaining diﬀerent forms of shared capitalist pro-
grams and employee involvement practices. Often, companies adopt such 
practices with the hope that these innovations will help motivate employees 
to work harder and smarter, stay with the company longer, and align more 
closely with a company’s strategy, things that will help the company perform 
better in the long term. Although this analysis is not intended to examine 
the eﬀects of stratiﬁ  cation, shared capitalism, or employee involvement on 
corporate economic performance, the NBER survey collected data on the 
attitudes of employees toward their jobs, their companies, and shared capi-
talism, outcomes that can have important eﬀects on employee and corporate 
performance. This provides a unique opportunity to examine how shared 
capitalism and employee involvement practices inﬂ  uence workplace atti-
tudes for diﬀerent groups.
Other chapters in this book show that shared capitalism appears to aﬀect 
important attitudes of employees in general. For example, chapter 4 ﬁ  nds that 
shared capitalism is positively related to perceived employee-  management 
relations and other measures of company treatment of employees, while 
chapter 7 ﬁ  nds a positive relationship to performance- related attitudes such 
as intention to stay with the company, loyalty, willingness to work hard, and 
perceived job eﬀort. It is possible, however, that these positive results across 
employees in general mask important variation among demographic groups. 
It is, therefore, valuable to explore such variation also as a way of testing 
the role of diversity in shared capitalism and the importance of extending 
shared capitalism to all employee groups.
Table 10.8 shows the results from models examining the impact of shared 
capitalism and employee involvement on three important workplace atti-
tudes for men, women, whites, African Americans, Hispanics, Asian Ameri-
cans, Native Americans, and employees with disabilities. The Shared Capi-
talism Index simply adds up the number of shared capitalism programs in 
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responses on three measures of employee participation: the level of involve-
ment in company level decisions, department or group level decisions, and 
job level decisions. The higher the value of this variable, the higher the level of 
overall involvement. The models also include controls (unreported) for occu-
pation, education, tenure with the organization, and ﬁ  rm level eﬀects. The 
models presented use ordered logit speciﬁ  cations, and positive coeﬃcients 
represent more positive outcomes.
What is most striking about these results is their consistency. Both par-
ticipation in shared capitalism and participation in decision making have a 
positive and statistically signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on all three attitudes for all groups. 
There are three exceptions to this pattern. Shared capitalism does not have a 
positive eﬀect on the likelihood of Hispanics staying at their jobs or on their 
willingness to work harder, or on the willingness of Native Americans to 
work harder. In no cases, however, does either shared capitalism or partici-
pation in decision making have a negative impact on attitudes. Both shared 
capitalism and employee involvement have the strongest eﬀects, in terms of 
the magnitude of the coeﬃcients, on employees’ loyalty to the company. The 
Employee Involvement Index also has stronger eﬀects on all attitudes than 
the Shared Capitalism Index. Overall, the results provide strong evidence 
that both participation in shared capitalism and in various levels of decision 
making lead to improvements in attitudes for all groups, despite the fact 
that many of these groups do not do as well as others in terms of accessing 
shared capitalism and power.
10.12      Conclusion: Implications for Management
Although these results should be very interesting to social scientists, they 
also have important implications for management. First, since the value of 
assets acquired through shared capitalism is usually directly related to pay, it 
is not possible to assume that implementing shared capitalism creates instant 
equity and fairness. The reality is that the implementation and operation 
of these plans occurs within broader structures of stratiﬁ  cation, and this 
reality may have negative consequences for the eﬀectiveness of these plans if 
employees perceive their implementation and operation as unfair. Substan-
tial disparities may be particularly important if certain demographic groups 
are concentrated in crucial occupational roles and experience disparities in 
access to and the beneﬁ  ts of shared capitalism. Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker 
(2003), for example, found that the performance eﬀects of employee stock 
option grants were inﬂ  uenced by larger grants to certain key employees, 
such as technical employees, managers, and individual contributors who 
were nonexempt.
Furthermore, the results show that, beyond the traditional mechanisms 
of stratiﬁ  cation, the ways in which certain types of shared capitalism (401(k) 
plans, proﬁ  t sharing, and gain sharing) are designed and operated can create Who Beneﬁ  ts from Shared Capitalism?    3 4 7
further disparities in access and ﬁ  nancial value for diﬀerent groups. Hence, 
to the extent that the structures of speciﬁ  c forms of shared capitalism are 
ﬂ  exible in terms of who gets access and the value of the ﬁ  nancial beneﬁ  ts 
that ﬂ  ow from these plans, management has the leverage to design plans to 
address the disparities uncovered in this analysis. The bottom line is that 
these disparities most likely produce outcomes that individuals in diverse 
categories would experience as unfortunate. However, the results from the 
analysis of employee attitudes provides very strong evidence that higher 
levels of participation in shared capitalism and involvement in decision mak-
ing can lead to better employee attitudes for all groups.
This chapter has revealed that the access that diﬀerent demographic groups 
have to shared capitalism and the wealth these groups receive through shared 
capitalism is sometimes unequal. Future research is necessary to understand 
the long- term eﬀects of shared capitalism on broader patterns of inequality 
in the United States. However, the results reveal that when oﬀered to diverse 
groups, shared capitalism and progressive human resource policies, such as 
employee involvement in decision making, are associated with better atti-
tudes. This suggests that companies with diverse employee populations can 
beneﬁ  t from paying attention to traditional inequalities, and how shared 
capitalism is shaped by and, in turn, inﬂ  uences these inequalities. This type 
of inequality, if left unaddressed, can siphon oﬀ the potential positive eﬀects 
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